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This paper clariﬁes the eﬀects of pension beneﬁt systems on aggregate hours
worked. By incorporating the labor income taxes and the social security taxes
into a representative agent model, previous studies successfully explain the long
term decline in the hours worked in some continental European countries, and the
diﬀerences between these European countries and the U.S. in recent years. However,
their model underpredicts the hours worked in Japan and Sweden. We measure the
marginal pension beneﬁt rates of the labor supply, which the previous studies do
not take into account, and incorporate them into previous studies. We ﬁnd that the
marginal pension beneﬁt can explain much of the discrepancy between the actual
hours worked and the predictions of the previous studies. This result also implies
that the pension beneﬁt might oﬀset the eﬀect of the unemployment insurance that
is thought to make the prediction worse in some continental European countries.
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 1 Introduction
It is generally considered that the development of social security conﬂicts with economic
performance. For example, Friedman and Friedman (1980) mentioned that “[welfare
policies] weaken the family; reduce the incentive to work, save, and innovate; reduce the
accumulation of capital; and limit our freedom” (pp. 127). What can economic theory
tell us on this issue?
In particular, Prescott (2004) ﬁnds that taxation can explain the diﬀerence between
the hours worked in the U.S. and in major European countries and the decline in hours
worked in these European countries in the 1970s and 1980s, by incorporating social
security taxes, labor income taxes, and consumption taxes into a representative agent
model. However, his model underpredicts the hours worked in Japan and Sweden. The
hours worked in Japan, which is the one of the longest for OECD countries, is much
longer than those in the U.S., although its tax burden is close to that of the U.S. The
hours worked in Sweden is not so much diﬀerent from those in the U.S. in the 1970s and
the 1980s, although the tax burden in Sweden, which is the one of the highest in OECD
countries, is markedly heavier than that in the U.S.
The purpose of this study is to show the extent that the pension beneﬁt can explain
this discrepancy between the actual hours worked and the theory, and demonstrate the
importance of a pension beneﬁt system on the hours worked in the macro economy.
Prescott (2004) does not take into account the pension beneﬁts because their scheme is
highly regressive in the U.S.; however, they are not in Japan and Sweden. In addition to
the regressivity, there are other reasons to take into account the pension beneﬁts. First,
the life expectancies in Japan and Sweden are longer than that in the U.S..1 Second,
the age of entitlement in Japan was 60 before 1994, and that in Sweden is 65 after 1977,
while that in the U.S. is 67 for people born after 1960. We measure the marginal pension
beneﬁt rates of the labor supply, and incorporate them with other taxes into the Prescott
(2004) model. We calculate the pension beneﬁts that were not realized but expected
for each year, because there were some changes in the pension beneﬁt systems, which
were not expected; therefore the agents make decisions under the pension system at each
point.
We ﬁnd that the marginal pension beneﬁt rates in Japan and Sweden reach ﬁve percent
and higher. The marginal pension beneﬁt rates can explain much of the discrepancy
between the actual hours worked and the theory in Japan and Sweden. These results
imply that the pension beneﬁt system could have a great impact on worker behavior.
These results for Japan and Sweden have an implications for other countries. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2006) incorporate the unemployment insurance into the Prescott (2004)
model, and demonstrate that their model underpredicts the actual hours worked in some
continental European countries. They paradoxically discuss “Why do French people work
so much?” In France, Germany, and Italy, the pension beneﬁt amount relates to the labor
income; therefore, the pension beneﬁt can increase the predicted hours worked, as it does
in Japan and Sweden.
This study also has an important implication for the literature on optimal social secu-
rity system and pension system reform from not funding (pay-as-you-go) to fully funding
or privatization.2 As many studies ﬁnd that the reduction in the U.S. pension system
1At 2005, the male (female) life expectancies in Japan, Sweden, and U.S. are 78.7 (85.7), 78.3 (82.7),
and 75.2 (80.4), respectively.
2See Feldstein (1985), Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Hubbard and Judd (1987), Imrohoroglu, Im-
rohoroglu, and Joines (1995), Huang, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1997), De Nardi,Imrohoroglu, and
Sargent(1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1999), Nishiyama and
2increases the labor supply if it is variable,3 similarly Prescott (2004) also emphasizes, it
is possible to convert a not funded pension system into a fully funded one in a way that
makes every generation better oﬀ. However, this theory might not be correct for the
countries where the pension beneﬁts are not regressive.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 is a literature
review. Section 3 and section 4 measures the marginal pension beneﬁt rates and analyze
the hours worked in Japan and Sweden, respectively. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
2 Taxes and Hours Worked
Prescott (2004) demonstrated that taxation can explain many of the variations in the
hours worked in G7 countries, by using a simple representative agent model and the
taxes measurement. We explain his methodology in this section.
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where ct and lt are consumption and working hours, respectively. The household’s budget
constraint is
(1 + ¿ct) ct + (1 + ¿xt)xt · (1 ¡ ¿lt) !tlt + (1 ¡ ¿kt)(rt ¡ ±)kt + ±kt + Tt ; (2)
where xt;kt;!t;rt;¿ct;¿xt;¿kt;Tt; and ± are the investment, the capital stock, the real
wage rate, the rental price of capital, the consumption tax rate, the investment tax rate,
the capital income tax rate, the lump-sum transfer, and depreciation rate of the capital
stock, respectively.
The representative ﬁrm maximizes the proﬁt:
yt ¡ !tlt ¡ rtkt; (3)
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From the ﬁrst order condition for lt of the ﬁrm,




Smetters (2007), and Nishiyama (2008).
3In the case of Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2009), the simulated labor supply changes little because the
substitution eﬀects and the income eﬀects, which are due to the loosening of the no borrowing constraint,
cancel each other out.
3From these equations,
lt







This equation implies that we can predict the aggregate hours worked from output,
consumption, tax rates, and calibrated parameters.









where Ct;It; and ITt are SNA private consumption expenditures, SNA private invest-
ment, and net indirect taxes, respectively4 The model economy’s consumption and output
are
ct = Ct + Gt ¡ Gmil;t ¡ ITct ; (10)
yt = GDP ¡ IT ; (11)
where Gt;Gmil;t; and GDP are public consumption, military expenditures, and gross





The labor income tax rate is calculated from5 6 7
¿lt = ¿ss;t + 1:6 ¯ ¿inc;t ; (14)
¿ss;t =
Social Security Taxes
(1 ¡ µ)(GDP ¡ IT)
; (15)
¯ ¿inc;t =
Direct Taxes paid by Households
GDP ¡ IT ¡ Depreciation
: (16)
Third, the calibration is as follows. The value of the capital cost share, µ, is set to
0.3224, which is the average for G7 countries, and the values of the individual countries
are close to each other. The utility of leisure parameter, ®, is 1.54, which is chosen so
4Prescott (2004) assumes that Ã equals 2=3 in each country. McDaniel (2007) measures Ã in OECD
countries from OECD Revenue Statistics, and she ﬁnds that those in Japan and Sweden are 0.702 and
0.372, respectively. Furthermore, McDaniel (2007) points out that the net indirect taxes contain property
taxes that are not imposed on the consumption and investment goods, and she reports that 10.5 percents
of the Japan’s net indirect taxes are property taxes. However, these measurement problems do not have
substantial impacts on the prediction.
5This deﬁnition of labor income tax rates is based upon comprehensive taxation. However, dual
income tax was adopted in Sweden in 1991. See Sorensen (1998). The progressivity of labor income tax,
1.6, is based upon the empirical study on the U.S. We check the progressivity of Japan in appendix B.
6In the case of Sweden, we add “Employers’ contribution to private pension insurance” to the nu-
merator in equation (15), because the private pensions in Sweden have characteristics similar to public
pensions. Details are discussed in section 4.
7McDaniel (2007) calculates the average tax rates from
¯ ¿inc;t =
Direct Taxes paid by Households
GDP ¡ IT
: (13)
4that the average labor supply is close to the data except for the two outliers. Prescott
(2004) assumes the same values of ® and µ for the all countries. This assumption enables
us to compare the hours worked for each country from a uniﬁed viewpoint.8 Prescott
(2004) employs a log-log utility function, ° = 1.
Table 1 shows the data and the prediction results that incorporate the measured
variables into equation (8)9. This model ﬁts the data reasonably well except for Italy,
Japan, and Sweden. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the data and the prediction of hours
worked in Japan and Sweden, respectively (baseline (gamma=1)).10 Both in Japan and
Sweden, this model consistently greatly underpredicts the data; the discrepancies reach
at most 5.5 hours in Japan and 12.8 hours in Sweden. The cause of this gap is due to
some unknown factors rather than the dynamic property of this simple model, such as
the lack of adjustment cost. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2006) point out that the
elasticity of labor supply assumed by Prescott (2004) might not be consistent with the
empirical studies. However, the results for Japan and Sweden discussed above do not
basically change, even if we employ diﬀerent values for the elasticity. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate the predictions that the values of ° are .5 and 2.11
3 The Case of Japan
3.1 The Pension System and Its Evolution12
There are many public old-age pension systems in Japan. However, the main systems are
the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI; Kousei Nenkin), the Mutual Pension Insurance
(MPI; Kyousai Nenkin), and the National Pension (NP; Kokumin Nenkin). The EPI
compulsorily covers full-time employees in the private sector that are under 70 years of
age and work for a corporatio or a company with ﬁve or more employees. The MPI
8Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2006) also analyze the hours worked in OECD countries by using
the average tax rates measured by McDaniel (2007) and a model similar to Prescott’s (2004) model.
However, they set the values of the utility of leisure parameter for each country such that the prediction
equals to the data at the initial year. Therefore, we can not analyze the cross country diﬀerences in the
hours worked in the manner of Ohanian et al. (2006).
9The data of hours worked is calculated from
(hours per worker ) £ ( # of employment )=(# of 15-64 population) : (17)
10It is pointed out that the long working hours of the Japanese include a considerable amount of unpaid
work. Mizunoya (2002) measured the hours of unpaid work from the diﬀerence between the household
survey data, the Japan’s Labor Force Survey (LFS), and the establishment survey data, the Monthly
Labor Survey (MLS), and demonstrated that the unpaid work of the male workers in 1993 were as many
as 270 hours.
Many statistics on hours worked do not take into account the unpaid work in Japan. The datasets of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre (GGDC), which are frequently used for cross country analysis, are basically based
upon the MLS (Figure 3). On the other hand, the data of many other industrialized countries do take
unpaid work into account. The OECD’s data for Canada, France, Italy, and the U.K. are based on the
household survey. Although the data for the U.S. are sourced from the establishment survey, the data is
adjusted to the hours actually worked. As a result, the data is close to the Current Population Survey,
which is a household survey. Although the data for Germany do not consider unpaid work because the
hours for full-time workers comes from the wage agreement data on the negotiated hours, Bell, Gaj, and
Hart (2001) and Mizunoya (2002) point out that the hours of unpaid work in Germany is very short.
11We calibrate ® for each value of °, such that the average values of the predicted hours worked in G7
countries, except for Japan in the early 70s and the mid 90s, equal to actual values.
12We refer to Ihori and Tachibanaki (2002) and Kaizuka and Krueger (2006) in this subsection.
5compulsorily covers full-time employees in the public sector that are under 70 years of
age. The MPI has many subsystems, but they are basically similar to EPI.13 Hereafter,
the term “EPI” includes both the EPI and the MPI. The NP compulsorily covers other
persons, such as self-employed, family workers, part-time employees, and the unemployed.
In 2005, EPI, MPI, and NP covered 33.0, 4.6, and 21.9 million persons, respectively.
The histories of the EPI and the NP go back to 1942 and 1961, respectively. Their
beneﬁt amount began to automatically relate to the inﬂation rate and the wage growth
rate in 1973, and the EPI’s replacement rate increased to over 35% in 1976.1415 The
EPI’s tax is basically a constant rate of the labor income, and the NP’s tax is a constant
amount.
We deﬁne EPIBjv(t) as the EPI’s old age pension beneﬁt amount, such that the
cohort born at year j expects at year t that they will receive at year v. During 1973–
1985, EPIBjv(t) is as follows:






+ :01 £ ARjv(t) £ T
EPI
j + ov: (18)
Tj is the coverage years. ´jv is the parameter of the portion that is related only to the
coverage years. ojv is the portion that is related to neither the coverage years nor the
average remuneration. ´jv and ojv automatically change with the inﬂation rate and the
wage growth rate after 1973. The so-called Average Remuneration, ARjv, is a kind of







where sj is the initial year coved by the EPI, ¯ sj is the last year covered by the EPI,
RARsv(t) is the reassessment rate that takes into account the inﬂation rate and the wage
growth rate, and Wjs is the annual wage.
During 1973–1985, employees could receive the EPI’s beneﬁt only when they were
covered by the EPI for 20 years or more. This restriction was based upon the policy
makers’ assumptions that the male employees worked during their prime age and that
their wives did not work or worked as part time employees. However, this assumption had
become unrealistic because more women had begun to work as the full-time.16 Therefore,
the minimum coverage years were shortened to 1 from 20 in 1985. At the same time, the
magnitude of the second term in equation (18) was determined to gradually decline to
7:5£10−3 from 10£10−3. These evolutions implied that the beneﬁt amounts of employees
who work fewer than 20 years increased; on the other hand, the total beneﬁt amounts of
employees who work 20 years or more decreased.
After 1985, the beneﬁt systems are diﬀerent regarding the ages of recipients. From
60 to 64 years old, the beneﬁt during 1986–1993 is as follows:
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EPI
j + ov; (20)
and after 65 years old,








+ ¸j £ ARjv(t) £ T
EPI
j + ov: (21)
13Therefore, we assume that the beneﬁt schemes of the MPI are same as that of the EPI.
14See Oshio and Yashiro (1997).
15For these reasons, we start the analysis after 1973.
16In 1986, the Japanese government ratiﬁed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, and enforced the Equal Employment Law for Women.
6There are two parameters that depend on the receipt year: BPv, which is the beneﬁt
amount of the Basic Pension, and ov (Table 2). There are four parameters that depend
on the cohort: ¯ T EPI
j , which is the maximum coverage years of the portion proportionate
only to coverage years, ¯ T NP
j , which is the maximum coverage years of the basic pension,
¹j, and ¸j. Index ¶j equals to 1 if the spouse is independently covered by a public pension
system, and equals to 2 if the spouse is not covered.17























As in the case of the EPI, the maximum coverage years were prolonged in 1985. The
parameters BPv and ¯ T NP
j are same as in equation (21), and are displayed in Table 2 and
Table 3.
Because the deterioration of the pension system ﬁnances were revealed in the 1990s,
the pension beneﬁts began to be reduced simultaneously with the increase in the tax rates.
The ﬁrst term in equation (20) was decided to be gradually reduced and then abolished
in 1994, and the second term was also abolished in 1999.18 Tables 4 and 5 display the
ages at which each cohort begins to receive them. In addition, the time varing parameters
such as ·v, RARsv, and BPv were targeted to change with the after-taxed labor income
in 1994; however this method was abolished in 1999, and in 2004 they were reduced by
0.9 percents and will remain at that rate until 2023.
3.2 Methodology
The measurement procedure for the pension beneﬁt rates is as follows. First, we calculate
the discounted sum of the marginal pension beneﬁts generation by generation because
the beneﬁt schemes are diﬀerent for each generation. In the calculation, we assume that
people expect the current beneﬁt system to continue until a new law is announced. We
simplify the calculation by using the relationship between the wage growth rate, the real
interest rate, and the discount factor in the Euler equation.19 Then, we take averages
of each generation’s beneﬁt using the number of employees as the weight. Finally, we
incorporate the measured marginal pension beneﬁt rates into equation (8).
As equations in the last subsection indicate, the marginal beneﬁts are diﬀer between
the coverage years and the Average Remuneration— in other words, between the extensive
margin and the intensive margin. We measure the return rates of the coverage years for
the following two reasons. (1) Kuroda and Yamamoto (2008) estimate the Frisch elasticity
in Japan by using yearly data, and ﬁnd that the elasticity of only the intensive margin is
very low, however, the elasticity both of the intensive margin and the extensive margin is
high.20 and (2) as Hayashi and Prescott (2002) describe, the hours per worker decreased
after the revision of the Labor Standards Law in 1988; therefore, we think that the law
has had a considerable eﬀect on the hours per worker. Additionally, in order to deal with
17In the measurement, we use the value of ¶j that is calculated from data.
18The persons insured by the EPI can receive the decreased (increased) ﬁrst term before (after) 65,
and those insured by the NP can also recieve the decreased (increased) pension beneﬁt before (after) 65.
We assume that all persons receive the pension beneﬁt at its standard age.
19See appendix A for more details on this point.
20Braun, Esteban-Pretel, Okada, and Sudou (2006) ﬁnd that the elasticity of intensive margin is higher
than that of extensive margin by using a quarterly data. We interpret that this diﬀerence is due to the
period of the data.
7two pension systems, we assume that households choose the employment rate given the
probability that they are covered by EPI or NP, that is, Âjs and (1 ¡ Âjs).
The discounted sum of the EPI’s beneﬁt amounts, ZEPI















jt is the life expectancy of generation j, and iu is the nominal interest rate.21
























where ejt is the employment rate, therefore, T EPI
j =
∑¯ sj
s=sj Âjsejs. The derivation of
EPIBjv(t) with respect to T EPI
j , namely epibjv(t), varies depending on t. We employ a
simpliﬁed deﬁnition of epibjv(t) as follows: during 1973–1984,
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j · v < vj);
·v £ ¹j + ¸j £ ARjv(t); (vj · v < 65);
¶j £ BPv ¥ ¯ T NP
j + ¸j £ ARjv(t); (65 · v · ¯ vJ
jt);
(28)
where vj and v′
j are the ages that the cohort j begins receiving the ﬁrst term and the
second term, respectively (Tables 4 and 5).22 We ignore the case where T EPI
j > Tj
21We do not take into account the income taxes on pension beneﬁt, because the measured income tax
rates in equation (16) contain them. In order to isolate the eﬀects of the pension beneﬁts, we have to
measure the marginal income tax rates on the pension beneﬁt, and exclude the taxes on the pension
beneﬁts in equation (16). However, we can not do so because there is no data about the taxes on the
pension beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, in Japan after late 1980s, a large part of the pension beneﬁts is not taxed,
because there were three important changesin the law that aﬀected taxation of the pension beneﬁt.
First, the uncovered spouse was granted the right of the pension beneﬁt in 1985, which corresponds
to BPtmin(1;Tj=¯ TNP
j ) in equation (21). Because the unit of taxation in Japan is the individual, this
change implies the decline of taxable income. Second, the marital special deduction and the pension
beneﬁt deduction of the Income Tax and the Residential Tax began in 1987 and 1988, respectively. The
Pension Finance show that a large percentage of the beneﬁciaries receives a pension beneﬁt amount less
than minimum taxable income after 1988.
22We assume that the new law is announced in the year before it is implemented.
8and T EPI
j > T ′
j because the authority sets Tj and T ′
j such that the EPI covers ordinary
full-time employees for the most.
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We calculate the average of the marginal pension beneﬁt amount, ³J
t , by taking the
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jt ) ; (33)
where EJ
jt is the number of workers.
Finally, we incorporate ³J



















The dataset is annual, and its period is from 1973–2006. The data of the GNP, private
consumption expenditure, private investment, government expenditure, salary and wages,
and taxes are sourced from 68SNA and 93SNA published by the Cabinet Oﬃce, Govern-
ment of Japan. The parameters of the beneﬁt, ´v;Ws;·v;¹j;¸j;¶j;BPjt; ¯ T EPI
j ; and ¯ T NP
j
are sourced from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998, 1999) and the website of the




































t denotes the aggregate number of workers in Japan, and xt is the average of marginal pension




(1 + ¿ct)ct = (1 ¡ ¿lt)!tht + xt =
(




!tht = (1 ¡ ¿lt + ³t)!tht: (35)
9Ministry of Health and Welfare.24 The life expectancy data, ¯ vjt are sourced from the
Abridged Life Table.
Because there is no data on the number of people covered by the EPI and the NP
generation by generation, we measure EJ
jtÂjt and EJ
jt(1 ¡ Âjt) from
E
J
jtÂjt = (ratio of cohort j in EPI) £ (total # of covered by EPI); (37)
E
J
jt(1 ¡ Âjt) = (ratio of cohort j in NP) £ (total # of covered by NP): (38)
The ratio of cohort j in the EPI are sourced from the Wage Census, whose coverage is close
to that of the EPI. The ratio of cohort j in the NP comes from the Labor Force Survey,
whose number of workers in the agricultural industry, self-employed, family workers,
temporary employees, and day labourers are in the non-agricultural industries.
In order to deal with the shortening of the EPI’s minimum coverage years in 1985, we





# of covered male; t < 1985;




average wage of covered male; t < 1985;
average wage of all covered employee; t ¸ 1985:
(40)
3.4 Result
Figure 4 displays the marginal pension beneﬁt rates. It rises in 1985 because the eﬀect
of the decrease in the minimum coverage years overcomes that of the increase in the
maximum coverage years. The sudden drops in 1993, 1998, and 2003 are caused by
the delays of the beneﬁt starting age and other factors. Because the arrears in the NP
becomes an issue of public concern, we measure the pension beneﬁt rates without the
NP. The pension beneﬁt rates of the NP are not large, especially after 1985, because the
number of those covered and the beneﬁt amount per person of the NP are smaller than
those of the EPI. Figure 5 illustrates the gross and the net tax rates of the entirety of the
social security and pension systems. The social security tax rates have increased since
the 1970s, which is the most important factor in the taxes that cause a decrease in the
predicted hours worked. However, if we take into account the pension beneﬁt rates, a
large portion of social security taxes are set oﬀ. Note that the pension’s net tax rates
were negative before 1993, and they remain under three percent even after 1993.
Figure 6 illustrates the prediction that takes into account the pension beneﬁts. The
pension beneﬁt can explain a large part of discrepancy between the data and prediction.
It increases the prediction by 1.6–2.3 per-week hours. However, as the pension beneﬁt
rates have declined, their positive eﬀect on the hours worked has become weak. This
implies that Japan’s hours worked continues to decline if the pension beneﬁt is reduced
due to the deterioration of the pension system’s ﬁnances. The prediction worsens in the
mid-1970s, which we interpret as follows. While the EPI’s expected beneﬁt amount was
largely increased in 1973, its contribution temporarily remained at a low level until 1976,
because of the depression due to the oil shock. Although the model employed does not
take into account any frictions in the labor supply, they seem to exist in reality. Because
the increase in the tax rate after the oil shock was announced, workers might not have
increased their labor inputs, in anticipation of the rise in the tax rate in the near future.
24http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/nenkin/zaisei/zaisei/index.html (in Japanese).
104 The Case of Sweden
4.1 The Pension System and Its Evolution25
The history of the old-age public pension system in Sweden began in 1913, when the
Pension Insurance Law was passed. In 1946, the National Pension Law was established,
which is a prototype of today’s Basic Pension (Allm¨ an Folkpension, AFP). The beneﬁt
amount of the AFP did not relate to the contribution or the income of the covered
person.26
The supplementary pension (Allm¨ an till¨ aggs pension, ATP) began in 1960. ATP
compulsorily covered all workers in Sweden agede 16 years or older, and whose annual
labor income is more than the Base Amount. The ATP’s beneﬁt scheme of cohort j at
year v is as follows:









BAs is the Base Amount, on which the amounts of the social security beneﬁts are calcu-
lated. Although it was fully linked to the inﬂation rate, it is linked only to 60 percent
of the inﬂation rate after 1995. Furthermore, 98 percent of the Base Amount is used in
the calculation of the social security beneﬁts after 1993. ¯ T ATP
j is the maximum coverage
years depending on the cohort (Table 6). APPj is the Average Pension Point, which is









PPjs is a growing variable because BAs does not relate to the real economic growth rate.
At the beginning, people could receive the beneﬁt beginning at age 67. That was reduced
to 65 in 1977.
In addition to AFP and ATP, there are several occupational pension systems. The
Industrins Till¨ aggspension (ITP), which covers the white-collar workers, was founded in
1960, and the S¨ arskild till¨ aggspension (STP) was agreed to be established in 1971 to
cover the blue-collar workers. Other occupational pension systems cover workers in the
public sector, with beneﬁt schemes similar to the ITP.28 Until the age of entitlement of
AFP and ATP was declined to 65 from 67 in 1977, the ITP and STP paid large amounts
between 67 and the retirement age, which was basically 65, although it was 62 for female
white-collar workers in private sector before 1971. The beneﬁt schemes of the ITP and















Ã £ min(wjsjhjsj;7:5 £ BAsj) + :325 £ max
(






















25We refer to Wadensj¨ o (1997) on this subsection.
26Therefore, we do not take into account the AFP in the measurement of the marginal beneﬁt rates.
27If the coverage years are less than 15, the APP is the average of these years.
28For this reason, we assume that these beneﬁt schemes are the same as that of the ITP. See Wadensj¨ o
(1997).
11sj is the year before retirement. PW STP
j is the STP’s “Pension Wage” that is the average
of a portion below the 7.5 Base Amount of the three highest annual wages between the
ages of 55 and 59. Ã equals to .65 for aged 65 or 66, and .1 thereafter. Then, the beneﬁt
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As equation (42) describes, the ATP’s marginal beneﬁt of additional annual labor
income for workers that earn more than 7.5 times the BAs is zero. However, as a substi-
tute for the ATP, the ITP pays 65 percent of the labor income before retirement of the
portion between 7.5 times and 20 times the BAs. In addition, the calculation considers
the limitation of PPjs is non-bindingin the case of blue-collar workers, because their labor
income is low.29
There were drastic changes in the pension system in the 1990s.30 The pension system
was converted from the deﬁned beneﬁt to the deﬁned contribution, and a part of the
pension tax was moved to reserve ﬁnancing.31
4.2 Methodology
During 1960–1999, the pension beneﬁt amounts of generation j at year s are generally
described as follows:
PBjs = AFPBjs + APTBjs + OPBjs; (47)
where AFPBjs is the beneﬁt amount of the AFP, and OPBjs is the occupational pension
beneﬁt.














29For these reasons, we ignore the limitation of PPjs and assume the occupational pension systems
pay 10 percent of the labor income before retirement in the measurement of pension beneﬁts.
30The new law was enacted in 1994, and enforced in 1999.
31For these reasons, we stop the measurement of the marginal pension beneﬁt in 1993.
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if 30 · (t ¡ j) < 60 and (v ¡ j) ¸ 67;
0 ; otherwise,
(54)













£ wsj £ hsj ¥ 30 ; if 30 · (t ¡ j) < 60
0 ; otherwise.
(55)
qjt is the ratio of workers covered by the occupational pension. The retirement year sj
is assumed to be the year when the cohort j reaches the age of 64. We assume that the
marginal pension beneﬁt of the APT becomes positive at the ages over 30–59, because
PPjs is a growing variable; therefore, these ages include the period of the 15 highest
Pension Points. With respect to OPBjv, we employ the same age setting because the
occupational pension systems count coverage years after the age of 28, and assume that
the annual labor income at the year before retirement equals to the average labor income,
that is, wjsjhjsj = wsjhsj.
The calculation of APPj is as follows. First, we assume the entire cohort’s wages at
year v are equal as follows:
wjshjs = wshs: (56)
13Then, because the Swedish National Accounts do not distinguish “the Owner-Occupied
Dwellings” and “the Other” in “the Enterpreneurial Income of Unincorporated Enter-
prises,” we can not calculate the self-employees’ income, and we calculate the average
wage by assuming the self-employees’ income equals to the employees’ wage:32
wshs =
Wages and Salaries
(# of total emp.) - (# of self emp.)
: (57)
With this assumption,
PPjs = PPs: (58)















Because there is no data on the future Pension Points, we assume that the Pension Points
grow at the constant rate gpp = 0:025, which is the average growth rate of PPv during
1963–2006:
PPs = (1 + gpp)
s−2006 PP2006; if s > 2006: (60)
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jt is the number of generation j employees. By incorporating ³S
t into equation
(8), we predicted the hours worked.
4.3 Data
Data of the GNP, private consumption expenditure, private investment, government ex-
penditure, salary and wages, and taxes are sourced from the OECD’s National Accounts
Detailed Tables. The total number of employees, the number of employees in the industri-
alized sector, and hours per worker are sourced from the OECD’s Labor Force Statistics.
The Base Amount is published by Statistics Sweden. The life expectancy is published by
the Statistiska Centralbyran. The real interest rate is calculated from the Government
bond yields (10 years) and the Consumer Price Index. These data are sourced from the
SCB. We use the average of real interest rate during 1997–2008 because the interest rates
in Sweden before the mid 1990s were unstable, such that the short term interest rate
became higher than the long term rate at some times.
4.4 Result and Discussion
Figure 9 displays the marginal pension beneﬁt rates (baseline), which are between 5 and
10 percent. There are two factors that cause the growth of marginal pension beneﬁt rates
32The calculated wages are close to the wage of the “Average Production Worker” published by the
OECD.
14after 1980: the increase in life expectancy and the change in the demographic structure
of employees. If the life expectancy had remained at the 1963 level, the marginal pension
beneﬁt rate in 1993 would decrease by approximately 1.7 percent (const. life exp.).33
Similarly, if the demographic structure had remained at the 1963 level, the marginal
pension beneﬁt rate in 1993 would decrease by approximately one percent, as a result,
the growing trend would nearly disappear (const. life exp. & stable demo. str.). Figure
10 shows the gross and net tax rates of the entirety of the social security and pension
systems. The gross tax rates on the social security are quite high, especially after 1978.
However, if we take into account the pension beneﬁts, a large portion of taxes are oﬀset.
Figure 11 illustrates the prediction that takes into account the pension beneﬁts. The
pension beneﬁt can explain 24–55 percent of the discrepancy between the data and the
prediction during 1970–1993, and it increases the prediction by 2.5–4.0 hours. Com-
pared with the case of Japan, there remains a large discrepancy between the data and
the prediction. One possible element of this remaining discrepancy is the other social
security beneﬁts. Rogerson (2007) and Olovsson (2009) point out that a some portion of
the Swedish government expenditure substitute for the leisure or the home production;
therefore, the hours worked in Sweden is longer than the prediction that ignores this cat-
egory of government expenditure. Our pension beneﬁt story and theirs are not exclusive
of each other. It is possible that the combination of these two factors can explain the
hours worked in Sweden. Of course, there could be other causes. Gustafsson (1992) and
Gustafsson and Jacobsson (1985) demonstrate that the introduction of separate taxation
in 1971 increased the female employment rates in Sweden. Although we assume the same
progressivity of labor income tax for all countries, it might not be relevant.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to show what degree the pension beneﬁt can elucidate the
discrepancy between the actual hours worked and the Prescott (2004) model in Japan
and Sweden, and demonstrate the impact of the pension beneﬁt system on the hours
worked in the macro economy. To this end, we measured the pension beneﬁt rates, and
incorporated them into the previous studies. We found that the marginal pension beneﬁt
rates reach ﬁve percent and higher in both countries, and the marginal pension beneﬁt
rates can explain much of the discrepancy between the actual hours worked and those
predicted by the theory.
These results implied that the pension beneﬁt systems could have signiﬁcant impacts
on the economic activities. In Japan, since the social security ﬁnances have deteriorated,
the pension beneﬁt amounts have been reduced and might be reduced further in the
future. This means that the hours worked in Japan might continue to decline. Because
the main cause of the deterioration of the social security ﬁnances is the growth of the aging
populace, there might be a decline in hours worked due to similar ﬁnancial deterioration
in other aging countrites.
Furthermore, pension beneﬁts might be able to answer the question that Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2006) raised— why the Prescott (2004) model is consistent with the data in
the continental European countries in spite of its ignoring the unemployment insurance.
As in Japan and Sweden, the increase in social security tax rates is the main cause of
the decline in predicted hours worked in France and Germany (Figure 14). The pension
33To deal with the increase in life expectancy, the pension beneﬁt amount of each cohort changes with
its life expectancy in the new Swedish pension system.
15beneﬁt systems in these countries are similar to those in Japan and Sweden; therefore,
the pension beneﬁts could oﬀset the eﬀect of the unemployment insurance.
As demonstrated above, pension beneﬁts could act as an incentive for work; in other
words, they could oﬀset the negative impact of the pension tax. We think, therefore,
that the development of social security, at least as a pension system, does not necessarily
conﬂict with the economic growth.
A Details in the Calculation of the Pension Beneﬁt
















































































BPv(t) ¥ ¯ T NP
j ; (t ¸ 1985):
(67)
In the calculation, we employ the assumptions below:





½j = 1; (69)
where ½j and Wt denote the time-invariant eﬃciency of a cohort j worker and the average
wage of workers covered by EPI, respectively. Because Djv(t), ARjv(t) and BPv(t) were


























































































































































































































































:009; if 2004 · u · 2023;
0; otherwise;
(82)
where gu is the wage growth rate, ¼u is the inﬂation rate, and g¿ is the growth rate of
the labor income tax rate imposed on employees.
In the steady state, from a Euler equation,
(1 + g)(1 + ¼)
1 + i
= ¯: (83)
We set the value of ¯, which is 0.977, from Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2008). In addition,
we assume that the wage growth rate, gu, is .02. The value of g¿, 0.0048, is calibrated
from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (1997), which stated that the proportion of the
social security taxes in the national income was expected to increase from 18.5 percent
in 1995 to 35.5 percent in 2025.
B Average Marginal Tax Rate of Labor Income Tax
In this appendix, we measure the labor income’s average marginal tax rate (AMTR)
following Joines (1981), Seater (1982), and Stephenson (1998), and then we check the
progressivity of the labor income tax in Japan by comparing the AMTR with the average
tax rate (ATR). When we measure the labor income’s AMTR in Japan, there are two
problems. First, there are two income taxes: the income tax of the central government
(National Income Tax) and that of the local governments (Residential Income Tax).
There are statistics of the income and tax amount for income classes for the former, but
not for the latter. Therefore, we measure the hypothetical tax amounts of the Residential
Tax, which come from the data on the taxation and deductions. Second, there are two
statistics: one for the employees of the private sector, and the other for the self-employees.
Therefore, we measure the AMTRs of each employee, and then we take the average.
B.1 Methodology
The methodology is as follows. First, we measure the marginal tax rate of the National










; (i = E;S); (84)
18where TNi
j;t and Zi
j;t are the average tax amount of the National Income Tax and the
average income amount of income class j, respectively. The super subscript i denotes the













where Xj;t is the labor income of income class j, and Xt is the aggregate labor income.
Second, we measure the hypothetical marginal tax rate of the Residential Income Tax.
Employing the data on the income and tax deduction, we calculate the average Residential
Income Tax amount for each income class,   TR
i
j;t. The data on the income deductions are
summarized in Tables 7 and 8. Then, the marginal tax rate of the Residential Income
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B.2 The Dawning of the Residential Income Tax
Before 1961, there were three taxation systems in the per-income levy (Shotoku Wari)
of the municipal inhabitant tax (Shi-Cho-Son Min Zei), which local government could
choose.34 The ﬁrst, second, and third system levied a part of the national income tax, the
taxable income of national income tax, and the taxable income minus national income
tax, respectively. The Ministry of Finance (1960, 1962, 1963a) report that the ﬁrst
system covered the largest part of the per-income levy of the municipal inhabitant tax.35
Therefore, we measure the municipal tax amount from the ﬁrst system during this period.
In 1962 and 1963, there were two taxation systems, the formula in the main text (Honbun
Houshiki) and the formula in the proviso (Tadashigaki Houshiki). Ministry of Finance
(1963a, 1964, 1965) report that the former covered a greater tax amount than the latter.
Therefore, we employ the former formula for the measurement. In 1964, the tax system
was uniﬁed.
B.3 The ‘Ku-Ro-Yon’ Problem
There were (and are) severe tax evasions by self-employed in Japan. This problem is
crucial to measuring the marginal tax rates because it means that data do not capture
the real income. Ishi (2001, pp. 64–70) reports that approximately 20 % of self-employed
income was untaxed due to deductions and 30–40 % due to unreported or underreported
incomes during 1970–1990.36 We can assume that a large portion of tax erosion is due
34The second and the third system had two subsystems, the formula in the main text (Honbun
Houshiki) and the formula in the proviso (Tadashigaki Houshiki), respectively.
35The most local governments employed the second system. However, the large part of these were
small governments (Cho or Son), therefore the coverage of the tax amount were low.
36Ohta, Tsubouchi, and Tsuji (2003). However, Arai (2005) criticize Ohta et al. (2003) on their
measurement procedure.
19to reported incomes below minimum taxable level because approximately 60–80 % of
the self-employed does not pay the income tax. These ﬁgures are calculated from the
diﬀerence between the number of self-employed tax payers in the tax statistics and the
number of self-employed in the Labor Force Survey.37 Here, we assume that all tax erosion
is due to the income below minimum taxable level.
B.4 Data
We employ two statistics: the Results of the Statistical Survey of Actual Status for Salary
in the Private Sector (SASP) and the Results of the Sample Survey for Self-assessment
Income Tax (SSIT). When the latter is employed to measure the tax rates of the self-
employed, Zj;t and Xj;t are diﬀerent because Zj;t includes capital income. Finally, the
total average marginal tax rates are calculated from the average of these two result.
B.5 Results
Figures 15, 16, and 17 display the measurement results for the employees, the self-
employed, and the weighted average of both, respectively. The ratio between AMTR and
ATR employees is stable, and its average, 1.74, is close to the 1.6 assumed by Prescott
(2004), that is, 1.6. However, the ratio for self-employed is diﬀerent. It falls below 1.3
after 1969, except for 1994. This phenomenon is due to the skew distribution of tax
payments. A large portion of the income of self-employed is not taxed; therefore, the
marginal tax rate for them is zero. As a result, the AMTR falls close to the average tax
rate.
The ratio between the AMTR and the ATR of the weight average is stable, and stays
between 1.4 and 1.7, except for 1954–1961 and 1994 (Figure 17). The decline of this ratio
around the late 1950s and 1960s is due to the development of the income deductions:
the establishment of the marital deduction and the expansion of the employment income
deduction. In 1994 there was a large cut in the tax rate in order to ease the depression
after the “bubble economy.” The ratio decreased in 2006 because the residential tax rate
uniformly became 10 percents for all tax payers.
Finally, we compare our ATR with the average income tax rate measured by Prescott’s
(2004) procedure, based on the SNA (Figure 18). These are close; however, tax rates
based on the SNA are higher than ours, except for 1960, 2006, and 2007. This diﬀerence
is due to the deﬁnition of taxes. The former is the total income tax rate, while the latter
is the labor income tax rate. Therefore, the gap becomes larger when the capital income
relatively increases; in the mid-70s when the inﬂation rate was high due to the oil shock,
and around 1990 during “bubble economy.”
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23Table 1: Actual and Predicted Labor Supply
Labor Supply Diﬀerence Prediction Factors
Period Country Actual Predicted Tax Rate (¿) Cons./Output (c=y)
1993-96 Germany 19.3 19.5 .2 .59 .74
France 17.5 19.5 2.0 .59 .74
Italy 16.5 18.8 2.3 .64 .69
Canada 22.9 21.3 -1.6 .52 .77
U.K. 22.8 22.8 0 .44 .83
U.S. 25.9 24.6 -1.3 .40 .81
Japan 32.2 29.0 -3.2 .37 .68
Sweden 21.8 15.2 -6.6 .69 .76
1970-74 Germany 24.6 24.6 0 .52 .66
France 24.4 25.4 1.0 .49 .66
Italy 19.2 28.3 9.1 .41 .66
Canada 22.2 25.6 3.4 .44 .72
U.K. 25.9 24.0 -1.9 .45 .77
U.S. 23.5 26.4 2.9 .40 .74
Japan 33.9 35.8 1.9 .25 .60
Sweden 23.7 19.1 -4.6 .62 .71
Note: The actual hours worked from Germany to the U.S. and the predictions from
Germany to Japan are sourced from Table 2 of Prescott (2004). The actual hours worked
in Japan and Sweden are sourced from Japan’s Labor Force Survey and OECD Labour
Database, respectively. The predictions of Sweden are our own calculation.




































25Table 3: Cohort Parameter of Pension Beneﬁts in Japan (1986–1993)
birth year ¯ T EPI
j ¯ T NP
j pj mj £ 103
–1926 35 25 1.875 10
1927 35 26 1.817 9.86
1928 35 27 1.761 9.72
1929 36 28 1.707 9.58
1930 36 29 1.654 9.44
1931 36 30 1.603 9.31
1932 36 31 1.553 9.17
1933 36 32 1.505 9.04
1934 37 33 1.458 8.91
1935 37 34 1.413 8.79
1936 37 35 1.369 8.66
1937 37 36 1.327 8.54
1938 37 37 1.286 8.41
1939 37 38 1.246 8.29
1940 37 39 1.208 8.18
1941 37 40 1.17 8.06
1942 37 40 1.134 7.94
1943 37 40 1.099 7.83
1944 37 40 1.065 7.72
1945 37 40 1.032 7.61
1946– 37 40 1 7.5
26Table 4: Entitlement Age of EPI’s “Fixed Amount Portion” (from 1994)










1949 - - - 62
1950 - - - 63
1951 - - - 63
1952 - - - 64
1953 - - - 64
1954– - - - - - -
27Table 5: Entitlement Age of EPI’s ”Remuneration-related Portion” (from 1999)










1961 - - - 62
1962 - - - 63
1963 - - - 63
1964 - - - 64
1965 - - - 64
1966– - - - - - -
28Table 6: Cohort Parameter in APT (Sweden)













29Table 7: Income Deductions of the Residentail Tax after 1962
index Income Deductions establishment this paper
1 Basic Deduction —
Marital Deduction
2 general 1966
3 special disabled 1983 from 1990
4 old 1981
5 special disabled 1990
6 Special Marital Deduction 1988
Dependent Deduction
7 general —
8 special disabled 1983 from 1990
9 old 1973 lack, 1975–77
10 special disabled 1990
11 old parents 1980
12 special disabled 1990
13 speciﬁt 1990
14 special disabled 1990
15 Employment Income Deduction —
16 Employees’ Speciﬁt Expenditure Deduction 1989 no data
17 Public Pension Deduction 1989
Family Employee Deduction
18 blue return —
19 white return —
20 spouse 1988 no data
21 Blue Retun Deduction 1973 no data
22 Disabled, Old, Widow, Widower, Student Dedution 1968
23 special disabled 1970 from 1977
24 old 1987 lack, 1980–88
25 special widow 1990
Other Deductions
26 casualty losses —
27 medical treatment —
28 life insurance —
29 private pension type 1985 from 1990
30 non-life insurance 1991
31 social insurance —
32 small enterprise mutual relief projects 1968
33 donation 1990 ignore
Note: The last column indicates the treatment of each deduction by this paper. If this column
is blank, we take into account that deduction from its deduction. Depending on the taxation
systems, deductions varied before 1962. Deductions in 1962 and 1963 are based upon the
formula in the main text. “casualty losses” (index 26) are permitted of a portion in that
excess of 10 percents of income. “social insurance” (31) and “small enterprise mutual relief
projects” (32) are permitted 100 percents deduction.
30Table 8: Income Deduction Amount of the Residential Tax
index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 22 23 24 25 28 29 30













1962 9 7 2.25
1963 9 7 2.25
1964 9 7 2.25
1965 9 7 2.25
1966 10 8 4 2.25
1967 10 8 4 2.25
1968 11 9 5 6 6 2.5
1969 12 10 6 7 7 2.5
1970 13 11 8 8 10 8 2.5
1971 14 13 10 9 11 9 2.75
1972 15 14 11 10 12 10 2.75
1973 16 15 12 14 12 14 14 2.75
1974 18 18 14 16 13 16 13 2.75
1975 19 19 17 19 16 19 16 3.5
1976 19 19 17 19 16 19 16 3.5
1977 20 20 19 20 18 20 18 3.5
1978 21 20 19 20 18 20 18 3.5
1979 22 21 19 20 19 21 19 3.5
1980 22 22 22 23 26 21 23 21 3.5
1981 22 22 23 22 23 26 21 23 21 3.5
1982 22 22 23 22 23 26 21 23 21 3.5
1983 22 22 25 23 22 25 23 26 21 23 21 3.5
1984 25.3 25.3 29.3 26.3 25.3 29.3 26.3 30.3 24 26 24 3.5
1985 26 26 30 27 26 30 27 31 24 26 24 3.5 0.35
1986 26 26 34 27 26 34 27 31 24 26 24 3.5 0.35
1987 26 26 34 27 26 34 27 31 24 26 24 3.5 0.35
1988 28 28 36 29 14 28 36 29 33 24 26 24 3.5 0.35
1989 28 28 36 29 14 28 36 29 33 24 26 48 3.5 0.35
1990 30 30 51 35 56 30 30 51 35 56 42 63 35 56 26 28 48 30 3.5 0.35
1991 31 31 52 36 57 31 31 52 36 57 43 64 36 57 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1992 31 31 52 36 57 31 31 52 36 57 43 64 36 57 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1993 31 31 52 36 57 31 31 52 36 57 43 64 36 57 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1994 31 31 52 36 57 31 31 52 36 57 43 64 39 60 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1995 33 33 54 38 59 33 33 54 38 59 45 66 41 62 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1996 33 33 54 38 59 33 33 54 38 59 45 66 41 62 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1997 33 33 54 38 59 33 33 54 38 59 45 66 41 62 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1998 33 33 54 38 59 33 33 54 38 59 45 66 41 62 26 28 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
1999 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 43 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2000 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2001 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2002 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2003 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2004 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2005 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2006 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2007 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
2008 33 33 56 38 61 33 33 56 38 61 45 68 45 66 26 30 48 30 3.5 3.5 1
Note: The index in the ﬁrst row correspond to the index in Table 7.
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Note: “Social Security (gross)” = ¿ss;
“Pension (gross)” =
(Pension Taxes)
(1 ¡ µ)(GDP ¡ IT)
;
“Pension Taxes” are sourced from SNA,
“Social Security (net)” = ¿ss ¡ ³
J
t ;
“Pension (gross)” = ”Pension (gross)” ¡ ³
J
t :


































1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
baseline
const. life exp.
const. life exp. & stable demo. str.
Note : “const. life exp.” is the marginal pension beneﬁt rates in the case that the life
expectancies are unchanged at the 1963 level. “const. life exp. & stable demo. str.” are
those in the case that the demographic structure of workers is unchanged from that of
1963 in addition to “const. life exp.”.













Note: “Social Security (gross)” = ¿ss;
“Pension (gross)” =
(Taxes of AFP & ATP) + X
(1 ¡ µ)(GDP ¡ IT)
;
“Taxes of AFP and ATP,” SCB.
X : “Employers’ contribution to private pension insurance,” SNA
“Social Security (net)” = ¿ss ¡ ³
S
t ;
“Pension (gross)” = “Pension (gross)” ¡ ³
S
t :
































































Note: “AMTR” denotes the average marginal tax rates (left-hand scale). “ATR” is the
average tax rates (left-hand scale). “AMTR/ATR” is the right-hand scale.

















Note: “AMTR” denotes the average marginal tax rates (left-hand scale). “ATR” is the
average tax rates (left-hand scale). “AMTR/ATR” is the right-hand scale.
















Note: “AMTR” denotes the average marginal tax rates (left-hand scale). “ATR” is the
average tax rates (left-hand scale). These values are the weighted average between that
of employees and that of self-employees. “AMTR/ATR” is the right-hand scale.









1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Tax Stat. (labor income)
SNA (income)
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